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Abstract:  
Deviations from normality in financial return series have led to the development of alternative 
portfolio selection models. One such model is the downside risk model, whereby the investor 
maximizes his return given a downside risk constraint. In this paper we empirically observe 
the international equity allocation for the downside risk investor using 9 international 
markets’ returns over the last 34 years. The results are stable for various robustness checks. 
Investors may think globally, but instead act locally, due to greater downside risk. The results 
provide an alternative view of the home bias phenomenon, documented in international 
financial markets. 
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1 Introduction 
Despite greater integration of international capital markets, investors continue to hold portfolios largely 
dominated by domestic assets. By the end of 2003, U.S. investors held only 14% of their equity portfolios in 
foreign stocks, whilst such stocks accounted for 54% of world market capitalisation (see Thomas, Warnock and 
Wongswan, 2004). Worldwide this lack of international diversification remains a puzzle to financial 
economists. Lewis (1999) suggests that a U.S. investor, maximising a mean-variance portfolio strategy should 
hold at least 40% in foreign stocks. Because such a high allocation is not seen in practise, assuming a mean-
variance strategy from a theoretical point of view, there are two explanations.  
Either, investors’ expectations of future returns abroad are consistently lower than finance theory predicts. 
In which case, investors appear to be pessimistic about foreign markets whilst relatively optimistic about their 
domestic market. Recent research has addressed this issue of lower expected returns being due to estimation 
error in the mean vector of returns (Hasan and Simaan, 2000). Information and transaction costs from foreign 
investment can also reduce the returns earned; although this has become less important as an explanation due to 
the globablisation of financial markets over the recent decade.  
Or alternatively, assuming returns from investing abroad are as high as expected, another way of looking at 
the puzzle is that investors’ perceive the risk from investing abroad as greater than the current theory predicts. 
In the mean-variance framework, this means that the risk from foreign equity investment is higher than is 
currently captured using the standard deviation of the historical returns. As French and Poterba (1991) point out 
this could be due to the relative unfamiliarity with foreign markets and institutions. Meaning that certain risks, 
such as sovereign risk or transfer risk, are larger than perceived and not fully captured in the standard deviation 
as the correct estimate for risk. The underlying assumption in a mean-variance world is that all risks facing an 
investor, in his decision to invest in foreign equity, are fully captured by the standard deviation of returns. It is 
this limiting assumption which we relax in our investigation of the home equity bias.  
In this paper we focus on a more general definition for risk as an explanation in resolving the puzzle. It 
appears that the risk of foreign investment is greater than previously thought resulting in the benefit from 
diversifying internationally being reduced. We therefore use a definition for risk which empirically captures 
this greater risk by specifying a model using downside equity risk. 3
In our analysis we focus on the empirical distribution of returns. In doing so, we can move away from the 
limiting assumption of normally distributed returns and the implicit assumption that the standard deviation 
captures all the risk inherent in financial time series. The advantage of this is that any non-normalities in the 
data enter the investor’s decision in the optimal portfolio strategy.  
It is well known that empirical time series are non-normal, however too our knowledge non-normalities 
have not been modelled as an explanation to the home bias. In risk management higher moments of the returns 
distribution, namely skewness and kurtosis, are commonly used to capture additional risk in the tails of the 
empirical return distribution. By focusing on the empirical distribution and a more general definition of 
downside risk, we are able to capture any non-normalities in the data, stemming from skewed and kurtotic 
financial time series and incorporate the effects of any additional risk occurring from these higher moments in 
the data.  
One non-parametric model for portfolio optimisation is the mean-downside risk model developed by 
Campbell, Huisman and Koedijk (2001). This model is able to optimise an investor’s portfolio of risky assets 
by maximising the mean-downside-risk portfolio under the assumption of a parametric distribution for the 
returns, or alternatively in a non-parametric manner, by using the empirical distribution of returns. The use of 
the empirical distribution is a particularly interesting case since it has the benefit of including any non-
normalities in the data into the optimal portfolio decision. Given certain parametric restrictions the model is 
consistent with capital market equilibrium.
2
We, therefore, focus on downside risk as the appropriate measure for risk. We model the investor’s 
optimal portfolio allocation using a mean-downside risk optimisation model. The investor is constrained by the 
desire to prevent his initial level of wealth falling below a given threshold. The higher the threshold the more 
safety the investor requires and the less tolerant he is to risk. Downside risk increases as the level of safety 
which an investor requires on his initial investment becomes greater. If the perceived risk from foreign 
investment results in a higher probability of exceeding the threshold occurring, the investor will choose to 
invest more domestically and less in foreign equity. 
By employing a downside risk portfolio allocation model and using data on international equity markets 
we provide empirical results to determine the extent of the risk-return trade-off facing investors in international 
financial markets. Due to greater downside risk the results provide evidence of a greater risk-return trade off in 
international equity markets than previously acknowledged for investors with a low level of risk tolerance. We 
                                                          
2 See Campbell et al. (2001) for a greater explanation to capital market equilibria. 4
also include emerging market data and short selling constraints. From this we are able to offer a plausible 
empirical explanation to the home equity bias. The empirical results are robust over various investor 
perspectives, and using a higher data frequency. Investors may think globally, but instead act locally, due to 
greater downside risk from investing internationally. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the following section we discuss the home bias phenomenon and 
previous explanations. Section 3 introduces the concept of downside risk, its behavioural foundations and 
specifies the optimal asset allocation under downside risk. By using data on international equity markets, 
section 4 investigates, in a detailed empirical study, how the downside risk approach assesses the risk-return 
trade off for various confidence levels associated with increasing levels of investors’ risk aversion. Our aim is 
to offer additional insight into how the downside risk approach is able to provide an alternative risk-return 
trade-off for assessing investors’ desires to invest internationally. Conclusions are drawn in the final section 5. 
2 The Home Bias Phenomenon 
The work of French and Poterba (1991) is probably the most prominent among the numerous studies 
which document the home equity bias. They report that investors in the U.S., Japan, and the U.K. allocate 94%, 
98%, and 82% of their respective equity investment, to domestic shares. Tesar and Werner (1995) study the 
long-term investment patterns of five major OECD countries and find supporting evidence for the home bias. 
They demonstrate that international investment positions are well below the current limitations on foreign 
holdings of institutional investors. Kang and Stulz (1997) present further evidence that the preference for 
domestic equity holdings is an international phenomenon. 
A simple mean-variance illustration based on the sample moments of returns implies that U.S. 
investors’ optimal weight in foreign equities is about 40%. Hence, the point estimates of the mean and the 
covariance matrix of returns suggest that U.S. investors would benefit by increasing the extent of their 
international equity diversification. Warnock (2002) shows that although the U.S. equity home bias has 
lessened somewhat over the past two decades, it still remains high. Thomas, Warnock and Wongswan (2004) 
conclude that by the end of 2003, U.S. investors held only 14% of their equity portfolios in foreign stocks at a 
time when such stocks accounted for 54% of the world market capitalization. This gap between investors’ 5
actual and presumably optimal behaviour has motivated several studies in the search to find an explanation to 
this home bias phenomenon. 
One perplexing fact is the large home bias found in small and medium sized countries. Cooper and 
Kaplanis (1994) conclude that domestic equity investment, as a fraction of total portfolio equity, ranges from 
65% in France to 100% in Sweden. Small countries, whose equity comprises a small fraction of the global 
mean-variance efficient portfolio, would presumably have the most to gain from international diversification.  
Common explanations for the pervasive home bias puzzle include barriers to international investment 
and transaction costs, information asymmetries and higher estimation uncertainty for foreign than domestic 
stocks, hedging demand for stocks with smaller positive correlation with domestic state variables such as 
inflation risk or non-traded assets such as human capital, and sovereign risk.
3 However, these common 
explanations seem less reasonable in today’s increasingly integrated financial world.  
None of these common explanations have provided a satisfactory quantitative account of the observed 
home bias in international financial markets. For example Lewis (1999) points out that the first group of 
explanations is weakened by the obstacles to international investment falling substantially over the last thirty 
years and the existence of large gross investment flows. Ahearne, Grivier and Warnock (2004) confirm that 
measurable transaction costs fail to explain the observed home bias. Pastor (2000) concludes that it is also far 
from clear that estimation uncertainty provides a good explanation. The second explanation is weakened by the 
magnitude with which foreign stocks should be correlated more strongly with domestic risk factors compared 
with domestic stocks. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) argue that this phenomenon cannot be explained by either 
inflation hedging or the directly observable costs of international investment. They show that correlations with 
deviations from purchasing power parity can even exacerbate the home bias puzzle. Baxter and Jermann (1997) 
indicate that the puzzle cannot be explained when the importance of human capital is accounted for, since 
investors should short sell their national stock market because of its high correlation with its human capital. 
Finally, sovereign risk, which comprises economic and political risk, seems to apply more to emerging market 
countries than to other mature financial markets, so cannot be a significant explanation. 
Although many of these barriers to foreign investment have substantially diminished, the tendency to 
invest in the respective domestic country remains very strong. Recent research suggests that the home bias 
puzzle may be part of a larger phenomenon in which investors’ exhibit a preference for familiar companies. A 
number of empirical studies have established an analogue to the home bias within countries themselves.  
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A company’s language, culture, and distance from the investor are three central attributes that might 
enlighten investors’ preferences for certain stocks. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) point out that a typical equity 
portfolio of a U.S. money manager consists of firms that are located in the 100 mile vicinity of his workplace 
than the average firm. Huberman (2001) analyzes the geographic distribution of shareholders of U.S. Regional 
Bell Operating Companies and shows that investors are much more likely to hold shares in their local providers. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that investors in Finland are more likely to hold stocks of companies which 
are located close to them geographically, which use their native tongue in company reports, and whose chief 
executives have the same cultural background. Finally, a recent study by Karlsson and Norden (2004) shows 
that age, gender, net wealth, occupation and familiarity with risky investments play a crucial role in the decision 
to allocate assets in foreign equities. 
These studies offer empirical evidence that people favour stocks with which they are familiar, and 
which they believe are more likely to deliver higher returns at lower stock-specific risk. This biases portfolio 
weights toward familiar stocks. Familiarity may represent information available to the investor, but not yet 
available in the market. Or it may represent the investors’ illusion that he has superior information now or a 
belief that he will potentially have superior information in the future. 
Although it is possible for investors to have superior information about companies located nearer to 
their home, they may also choose to invest in firms in close proximity because of (perceived) expertise. Agents 
may invest in familiar securities because they prefer to take a stake in a context in which they consider 
themselves to be knowledgeable and competent. This is defined by Heath and Tversky (1991) as the 
‘competence hypothesis’. Experimental evidence provided by Kilka and Weber (2001) suggest that agents feel 
more capable and are relatively more optimistic about their home equity market
4. This optimism, in turn, 
translates into greater investment in familiar companies. 
Following Barberis and Thaler (2002), experimental evidence suggests that people dislike situations in 
which they are uncertain about the probability distribution of a gamble. Such circumstances are known as 
‘situations of ambiguity’, while the general dislike for these kinds of situations are known as ‘aversion to 
                                                          
4 Support for this relative optimism hypothesis is also given by the empirical results of Strong and Xu (2003) 
who analyze the Merrill Lynch Fund Manager Survey, with respect to U.S., U.K. European, and Japanese fund 
managers. 7
ambiguity’.
5 Ambiguity aversion translates into significant carefulness by investors with regard to unknown 
stocks. 
Familiarity and aversion to ambiguity offer a simple way of understanding sub-optimal international 
asset allocation. Investors may find their national stock markets more familiar and, thus, less ambiguous than 
foreign stock indices. Since familiar assets are attractive, people invest heavily in those, and invest little or 
nothing in ambiguous assets. Therefore, their portfolios appear undiversified relative to the predictions of 
standard finance models. Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) argue that although agents on some occasions appear 
to have a vague impression that diversification might be beneficial, they still fail to diversify their financial 
investments adequately.
6  
All the explanations for the home equity bias result in greater risk from investing internationally. This 
risk is captured implicitly in the empirical return distribution using the domestic currency. When assuming a 
parametric distribution as a generalizing assumption for the empirical distribution of returns, as is common in 
most modelling applications, any additional risk in the form of deviations from the Gaussian normal 
distribution are lost. To include these factors, we adopt a model which is able to focus on the empirical 
distribution of returns for optimal portfolio allocation. One such model which focuses on the empirical 
distribution is the downside risk model of Campbell et al. (2001). 
3 The Concept of Downside Risk in Financial Markets
It is commonly accepted that investors care more about downside loss, than upside gains. Roy (1952) 
first proposed the ‘safety first’ approach to portfolio optimisation as early as 1952. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) used loss aversion preferences, and Gul (1991) used disappointment aversion so that investors could 
place a greater weight on the loss than on their gains. Advances in behavioural finance research can help us to 
determine how investors perceive risk. Many of the advances centre on the inadequacies behind some of the 
axioms on which expected utility theory is based. Rather than imposing a rigid framework for investor 
                                                          
5 An early discussion of this aversion to ambiguity can be found in Knight (1921); who defines risk as a gamble 
with known distribution, and uncertainty as a gamble with unknown distribution, and suggests that people 
dislike uncertainty more than risk. 
6 Moreover, Benartzi (2001) shows that when agents actually diversify risks, they tend do so by following naïve 
diversification strategies such as the 1/n heuristic. 8
preferences, behavioural finance allows for non-standard behaviour. This is driven by quasi-rational behaviour 
or non-standard preferences, which is often based on empirical and/or experimental findings. 
Research in the area of behavioural finance has shown results that contradict the axioms and 
assumptions of expected utility theory. Under expected utility, an equal diversification of risks is optimal, but 
under prospect theory, conversely, risk concentration will be most favourable. The intuitive reason behind this 
strong result is that a prospect theory agent is risk-seeking over losses. Investors’ attitudes change over the 
domain of the utility function and differ between negative and positive domains; thus individual investors treat 
gains and losses differently. The crucial features of prospect theory which drive this outcome are the investors’ 
degree of loss aversion and in particular their diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses. Loss aversion implies 
that changes are evaluated as gains and losses compared to a reference point, with losses looming larger than 
gains. It is for these reasons we choose to focus on downside risk, in a model for optimal portfolio allocation.  
To recapitulate, there are two advantages from using this model. Firstly, the risk to the investor from 
investing abroad is specified relative to a benchmark, which in this case is the domestic risk-free rate. This 
results in the advantage of an investors’ decision being made with reference to his home country. The second 
advantage is the benefit of using a non-parametric distribution for the optimization. By moving away from the 
restrictive assumption of normality, we are able to observe irregularities in the data, and the effect of any 
additional risk occurring from either negative skewness and/or fat tailed distributions. 
We apply the downside risk model from Campbell et al (2001) for portfolio allocation under a 
downside risk constraint. This model builds upon the model of Arzac and Bawa (1977) however focuses on the 
loss in terms of Value-at-Risk rather than simply specifying an admissible probability of failure. The investor’s 
budget constraint is defined as the following equation for initial wealth W(0) and borrowing B:
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The investor chooses the fractions of asset i, γ(i) to be invested at time 0. The investor is assumed to 
allocate the assets in the portfolio and to choose the amount to borrow or lend so that the expected level of final 
wealth is maximized. Investor preferences in the ‘safety first’ world are such that he or she wishes to be c% 
confident that the final value of the portfolio at time T will not fall below a given downside risk level. The level 9
of downside risk is captured in the downside risk constraint, with the desired level of absolute Value-at-Risk, 
denoted VaR : 
) 1 ( } ) 0 ( ) , ( Pr{ c VaR W p T W − ≤ − ≤ . (2) 
Because we are focusing solely on the risk of losses, our measure for risk depends on the downside 
only. Hence, the expected wealth from investing in portfolio p at the end of the investment horizon becomes: 
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Campbell et al. (2001) derive that the optimal asset allocation occurs when equation (3) is maximized. 
This results in maximizing equation (4): 
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where r(p) and rf are the returns on the portfolio and the risk free rate respectively. Thus, the numerator is the 
risk premium and the denominator is the expression for risk, defined as follows: 
) , ( ) 0 ( ) , ( p c VaR r W p c f − = ϕ . (5)   
The level of risk aversion depends crucially on the confidence level associated with the investors’ 
downside risk constraint: the more safety the investor requires, the higher the confidence level associated with 
the downside risk constraint and the less tolerant the investor is to risk. In this way the higher the confidence 
level c, the more risk averse is the investor.
7  
One of the features, which the downside model also incorporates, is an investors’ notion of regret. The 
investor assesses the risk from an investment, with reference to the value the initial wealth would have attained 
if invested over the period at the risk-free rate
8. The investor, therefore, uses the risk-free rate of return as the 
benchmark to assess the potential allocation strategy. Risk is assessed relative to a benchmark return. For 
example, the average level of consumption or the deviation from the risk-free rate of return.  
                                                          
7 This is different from the individual confidence which an investor may have, as in Graham, Harvey and 
Huang (2004). They find that individual investor confidence can explain why investors trade more frequently 
and hold more internationally diversified portfolios. 
8 The reference rate could be an alternative specification in the model, such as the average market return. 10
4 Empirical Analysis 
In this section we employ the downside risk model using empirical data. In a first step, we are able to 
observe the risk-return trade-offs for the US domestic and international markets. We see how the risk-return 
differs from the consumption-based approach to asset pricing, and discuss the results of modeling the optimal 
asset allocation under downside risk. 
We use monthly data from the MSCI indices in US dollars for the G7 countries: Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US, as well as the 3 month Treasury Bill for the risk free rate, from 
Datastream. The data are available from January 1970 until December 2004 for the MSCI indices. 
Unfortunately the data for Emerging Markets, such as for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Korea and 
Thailand, only date back to January 1988, so we focus on Hong Kong and Singapore only. Summary statistics 
for the series are given in Table 1.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
Over the sample period, Hong Kong had the highest average monthly return, translating into an 
average annual return of 15.2%. It was also the most volatile, with a variance of 39.2% on an annual basis. 
Singapore was the second most volatile market with 24.8% annual volatility and an average annual return of 
10.8%. These returns were slightly less than in the UK, which averaged an 11.0% annual return, but a less 
volatile 14.1% annual variance. The US was the least volatile market with a 6.9% annual variance, but with a 
10.2% average return. Importantly the correlation statistics in Table 2 indicate benefits from diversification for 
the US investor, investing in foreign equity markets. Correlations range from 0.328 with Japan to 0.728 with 
Canada.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
Returning back to Table 1 we can also see that apart from the Japanese MSCI, all the other series have 
highly significant excess kurtosis. The Jarques-Bera test rejects the hypothesis that these series are normally 
distributed. This will result in excess downside risk to the investor, apparent in the data, when observed from a 
US perspective. It is likely to be caused by the additional risks from investing internationally. Given the 11
apparent non-normality in the data, we look at how the downside risk model optimizes an international 
portfolio of equities, and compare the results to the mean-variance investor. 
4.1 US Perspective without Short-selling Constraints 
Using the data on the MSCI indices we optimize equation (4), focusing on the US as the domestic 
country. We maximize the expected return over and above the US risk free rate. This perspective is important 
since we focus on the US as the home market. We use all combinations of portfolios containing all G7 equity 
markets over the downside risk of each portfolio combination. The optimization is performed for each 
confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint. We chose the 95%, 97.5% and 99% confidence 
levels which are commonly used in risk management. We are therefore able to determine how much a US 
investor is likely to invest in foreign equities, given the US T-Bill as the benchmark reference point. In this way 
we can focus on the home equity bias from the US investors’ perspective. The results are shown in Table 3 and 
are depicted in Figure 1.  
The model does not require any assumptions to be made as to the nature of the distribution. We derive 
optimal portfolios using both the empirical returns and for multi-variate normally distributed returns. 
Alternative parametric distributions could also be used.  
In Table 3 we show the results obtained when optimizing the model using the empirically observed 
distribution to the assumption of parameterizing the model using the normal distribution. The results, under 
normality, only differ slightly from the mean-variance optimization. The difference is due to the positive risk 
free rate in the denominator of equation (4). This, therefore, gives us a good indication of how the investor 
optimizing a downside risk constraint differs to the mean-variance investor for differing levels of risk aversion.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
From Figure 1, using the empirical distribution, we can see two very important facts. Firstly the US 
investor allocates a greater proportion of his portfolio to the domestic market as the confidence level associated 
with the downside risk constraint increases. This means that as investor’ require greater levels of certainty with 
their investments, investors become more concerned about the value of their portfolio not dropping below a 
certain level. The greater the confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint, the more averse the 12
investor is to downside risk.  Secondly the allocation in the domestic portfolio is greater than would be the case 
using mean-variance portfolio optimization.
INSERT FIGURE 1 
Interestingly, the more averse the investor becomes to downside risk, the greater the proportion of 
their total portfolio allocated into the domestic asset. This is a significant result. Under the assumption of 
normality, the proportion held in the domestic market is constant, regardless of the confidence level chosen in 
association with the downside risk.
9 This is because the quantile of the distribution is assumed to be a function 
of the standard deviation of the distribution. For example, the 95% level for the Value-at-Risk in the downside 
risk constraint is a 1.95 multiple of the standard deviation, and for the 99% level, a multiple of 2.33 is used. 
This means that the optimal allocation is independent from the quantile level; hence the optimization results in 
the same international allocations. It is the assumption of normality which results in the same portfolio of risky 
assets.
10  
When a non-parametric distribution is used, the portfolio of risky assets changes with the assumption 
of the confidence level associated with the risk free rate because of irregularities in the data. It is the non-
parametric nature of the model which results in a changing optimal allocation of risky assets. This enables us to 
include the investors’ domicile in the decision to invest internationally. Using the notion of regret, regret is 
higher when investing abroad, since the deviation from the benchmark is potentially greater. Thus the 
confidence level associated with the investor‘s downside risk constraint is higher. 
To explain the well-documented lack of international diversification by US investors, the confidence 
level chosen by the investor must be substantial. From our empirical results using the G7 countries, the risk 
aversion level of the representative investor is associated with a confidence level on the downside risk 
constraint of nearly 97.5% on a monthly basis.  
By optimizing the portfolio for the downside risk investor, using both the empirical distribution and 
the assumption of normality, and including the emerging market data, our model provides us with similar 
results. Again, the allocation into the domestic market becomes greater as the investor desires a greater degree 
of confidence in his downside risk constraint. The more averse to risk he becomes, the greater the allocation 
                                                          
8  The slight deviation in the results under the assumption of normality are due to the estimation error around 
the point estimate. This increases for higher confidence levels given the few observations available for higher 
confidence levels in the downside risk constraint. 
9   It can be proven that two-fund separation is attained: first the risky portfolio is chosen and then the amount 
invested in the risk-free rate is determined, depending on the risk tolerance of the investor. 13
into US equities. The allocation is lower in the US however increases in a similar pattern over the confidence 
range. 
INSERT TABLE 4 & FIGURE 2 
4.2 US Perspective with Short-Selling Constraints 
Taking short sale constraints into consideration, the results are consistent with those without short 
selling constraints, at lower levels of confidence associated with the downside risk constraint. However, for the 
99% level of confidence, we observe a lower level of investment in US equity. This is compensated by a
significantly greater proportion of the portfolio devoted to Canadian equity, which is highly correlated with the 
US market. Furthermore the US investor also prefers to allocated a greater proportion to Japanese equity. This 
in itself is an interesting result since the allocation is the optimal point using the empirical distribution and is, 
no doubt, driven by normality in the data. Japan presents the investor with less downside risk, resulting from 
less kurtotic returns. Japan attracts the highly constrained US investor to invest a greater proportion into its 
market. It would appear that at such a high level of aversion to downside risk, the US investor prefers to 
substitute a relatively large proportion of his US equity holdings for the apparent safety of the Japanese market. 
Remember from Table 1, the return series observed over the 34 year period from the Japanese equity market 
was not significantly different from normal. Thus the downside risk was less in this period than for all other 
equity markets considered. It appears that under short selling restrictions, the risk to the US investor from 
extreme market movements (in the bottom 1% of the quantile of the distribution) is less than the additional risk 
of investing abroad. Only in such a case is he willing to substitute the additional risk from investing abroad for 
the safety of less extreme market fluctuations. 
FIGURE 3 
This result may also be emphasized by the low correlation coefficient between the two markets. The 
correlation between the US and Japan is the lowest of all the equity markets considered, even including the two 
emerging markets. The effects from extreme market movements, coupled with size conditional correlation 
coefficients, are intrinsically captured in the empirical data, but are lost when parameterization of the 
distribution occurs for modeling asset allocation. 14
Empirical research has shown that as we move further into the tails of the distribution, where extreme 
events occur, the correlation between international markets increases, and hence the benefits to diversification 
are reduced.
11 In the downside risk framework, for optimal asset allocation we need not assume a constant 
coefficient for the joint distribution of returns. Conditional correlation effects are captured in the empirical 
estimate for correlation so the effects of increasing correlation coefficients are inherently captured. It is highly 
likely that the effect of increasing correlation in the left tail of the distribution accounts for the changing 
empirical optimum. This effect is not captured under normality, where correlation is assumed to be constant 
over the distribution.   
In the downside risk framework, because we are not required to impose any restrictive modeling 
assumptions as to the nature of the parametric distribution for the joint return series, the impact of non- 
normalities in the data can be observed and incorporated into the decision to invest internationally. Since the 
conditional correlation coefficients between markets are captured in the measure for downside risk, if there are 
any increases in conditional correlation the benefits from investing internationally decrease, and the model is 
able to pick up these attributes through the use of the empirical distribution. The results enable us to see how 
important the conditional correlation coefficient becomes in the decision to hold international assets, and the 
use of the empirical distribution enables us to correctly assess the true underlying downside risk of investing in 
foreign equity. 
If it is the case that investors focus on a high confidence level, where correlation is higher between 
international financial markets, then the benefits to international diversification are reduced dramatically, 
through greater downside equity risk. The results, therefore, indicate a rational explanation of the lack of 
international diversification and the phenomenon of the home bias, where investors are generally worried about 
potential downside losses. The model provides an alternative view of the risk-return trade off in international 
financial markets, without having to resort to very high levels of relative risk aversion. 
4.3 US Perspective and Daily Data 
For checking the robustness of our empirical results we extend our original dataset and employ daily 
data from the Datastream total return indices in US dollars for the G7 countries: Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the UK and the US, as well as the 3 month Treasury Bill for the risk free rate. The data are 
                                                          
10  See Butler and Joaquin (2002), who estimate that the occurrence of greater correlation in bear markets 
results in the Sharpe ratio being more than 50% too large. See also Campbell, Koedjik and Kofman (2002) who 
provide empirical evidence of increasing correlation in the left tail of the distribution. 15
available from January 1973 until December 2004. For consistency with our previous results we only focus on 
Hong Kong and Singapore as emerging markets only. Summary statistics for the series are given in Table 5. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
Over the sample period, Singapore had the highest average daily return with 0.107%. It was also the 
most volatile, with a daily variance of 0.029. Hong Kong was the second most volatile market with 0.019 daily 
volatility and an average daily return of 0.047%. These returns were slightly less than in France, which 
averaged a 0.049% daily return, but a less volatile 0.012 daily variance. Canada was the least volatile market 
with a 0.009 daily variance, but with a 0.038% average daily return. Correlation statistics in Table 6 again 
indicate diversification benefits for the US investor, investing in foreign equity market, ranging from 0.644 with 
Canada over 0.376 with the UK to 0.063 with Japan. 
INSERT TABLE 6 
Returning back to Table 5 we can also see that all daily MSCI return series have highly significant 
excess kurtosis. As in the monthly data analysis, the Jarques-Bera test rejects in all cases the hypothesis that 
these series are normally distributed. This will result in excess downside risk to the investor, apparent in the 
data, when observed from a US perspective. 
Using the data on the daily MSCI indices we again optimize equation (4), focusing on the US as the 
domestic country, following the same procedure as for the monthly data, however the use of daily data results 
in over 8300 daily observations and a far greater number of portfolio combinations in the optimization process.   
Table 7 displays the results obtained when optimizing the model using the empirically observed 
distribution to the assumption of parameterized the model using the normal distribution.  
INSERT TABLE 7 
Table 7 shows the empirical results for the daily indices including emerging markets, with and without 
short-selling constraints from the perspective of a US investor. Comparing this table to Table 4 we see that the 
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empirical results are robust to using daily instead of monthly data. The allocation is greater as the confidence 
level associated with the downside risk constraint becomes larger. Interestingly the home-bias phenomenon is 
more greatly pronounced with a significantly greater proportion of the portfolio being allocated to the domestic 
asset. Again, taking short sale constraints into consideration, as in the case of monthly data, a similar pattern 
arises and the empirical results of the daily data are highly consistent with those without short selling 
constraints. Again the home bias is slightly less at the 99% level of confidence when short selling constraints 
are included. 
From Figure 4, using the empirical distribution of daily returns, we can see that as in the case of the 
monthly MSCI indices, the US investor allocates a greater proportion of his portfolio to the domestic market as 
the confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint increases. US investor’ require greater levels 
of certainty with their investments, they become more concerned about the value of their portfolio not dropping 
below a certain level. The greater the confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint, the more 
averse the investor is to downside risk. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
Interestingly, as in the case of the monthly data, the more averse the investor becomes to downside 
risk, the greater the proportion of their total portfolio allocated into the domestic asset. Figure 5 indicates that as 
in the case of monthly data, by using daily data and including emerging markets and short selling constraints, 
we see that at the 99% level of confidence, we observe a lower level of investment in US equity. 
FIGURE 5 
It appears that under short selling restrictions, the risk to the US investor from extreme market 
movements is less than the additional risk of investing abroad. Only in such a case is he willing to substitute the 
additional risk from investing abroad for the safety of less extreme market fluctuations. 
4.4 International Perspective 
In this section we extend our analysis to analyze whether the observed home bias phenomenon from a 
US investors’ perspective is an international phenomenon. In order to check for the robustness of our empirical 
results, we analyze the optimal portfolio allocation from the perspective of a Japanese, and UK and a European 17
investor, respectively. This allows us to answer the question of whether this observed phenomenon is an 
exchange rate effect. 
Using the data on the daily Datastream indices we optimize equation (4), focusing on Japan, the UK, 
and France as the domestic countries, respectively. We maximize the expected return over and above the 
Japanese, UK, and France risk free rate, respectively. We use all combinations of portfolios containing all G7 
equity markets over the downside risk of each portfolio combination. As in the case of the US investor, the 
optimization is done for each confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint. This allows us to 
determine how much a Japanese, a UK or a France investor is likely to invest in foreign equities, given the 
respective risk-free rates as the benchmark reference points. 
Table 8 shows the results obtained when optimizing the model using the empirically observed 
distribution to the assumption of parameterized the model using the normal distribution. It indicates that the 
empirical results by using monthly data and including emerging markets without short selling constraints are 
highly robust to the choice of domestic country.
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INSERT TABLE 8 
The empirical results are robust for the three cases of a Japanese, a UK and a French investor. A higher 
proportion of the portfolio is allocated to the domestic market than suggested under the mean variance 
approach. We can therefore assume that this for the US investor observed phenomenon of a home bias is an 
international phenomenon. For the French investor it also becomes safer to invest in neighboring Germany, 
which is also highly correlated for the higher confidence levels. 
Table 9 displays the empirical results of the portfolio allocation for a Japanese, and a UK, investor, 
respectively, when using daily data from Datastream, again including emerging markets and no short selling 
restrictions. 
INSERT TABLE 9 
Table 9 shows that we can observe again an international home bias from the perspective of the UK, however 
the results are less robust for the Japanese investor. Tricky with the introduction of the Euro in 1999, and then 18
from 2000 there was a bear market so that the portfolio allocations are no longer reliable and relevant for the 
analysis. 
Summing up, the international home bias phenomenon holds and can be well-explained with our mean-
downside risk approach. It is robust for monthly and daily data as well as from the international perspective of 
Japanese, UK and European investors, respectively. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
The home equity bias puzzle can be framed as a result of the empirical risk-return trade-off being 
larger than otherwise captured in current finance theory. Either returns are lower than expected, or risk 
perceptions are higher from investing in foreign equity. This results in a foreign market for equity being less 
attractive to the domestic US investor. Although many explanations have been given as to the various elements 
involved in determining any additional risk to the investor from investing in foreign corporate equity, the 
assumption is maintained that the variance of the empirical distribution adequately captures the risk facing the 
investor. Even when additional types of risks and costs are factored into the standard expected utility and mean-
variance framewo rk , the degree of risk av ersion still necessary  to result in such a high allocation into the 
domestic market is unrealistically high.   
Behavioural approaches to the home bias puzzle draw upon psychological aspects of individual behaviour. 
So far, in the literature, the familiarity of companies’ overly optimistic predictions of domestic companies’ 
performance and (perceived) subjective competence in the home market have been put forward as possible 
explanations. These features are difficult to factor into a model of optimal portfolio choice in order to 
successfully address the issue of the home equity bias.  The paper applies behavioural insights such as prospect 
theory and familiarity and ambiguity aversion to one of the classical problems in finance literature: the 
investor’s optimal asset allocation under risk. In particular, we investigate the use of downside risk, focusing on 
negative movements in stock markets for the assessment of risk, to see if the downside risk approach to asset 
allocation is able to provide greater insight into the equity home bias puzzle.  
Using monthly MSCI data and daily data from Datastream for the G7 countries we are able to express 
the risk-return trade-off in financial markets in an alternative way, shedding new light on the puzzle 
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surrounding the size of the home bias. We find that, contrary to mean-variance portfolio analysis, investors 
concerned with downside risk tend to hold a larger proportion of their portfolio in domestic equities with 
increasing aversion to risk. This is captured in the degree of confidence an investor associates with his 
downside risk constraint in determining the optimal portfolio allocation. 
We controlled for robustness in various ways. We analyzed the risk-return trade-off from the 
perspective of an US investor by using monthly data and by including emerging markets and with and without 
short selling constraints. In a second step, we were able to increase the number of observations dramatically 
using daily return series, which is important given the high percentiles used in the examples. The results are 
extremely robust to the use of daily data and for the US the extent of the home-bias actually becomes more 
pronounced. Daily data is known to deviate more from the assumption of normality and greater downside risk is 
captured by the model. US investors therefore shy away from international diversification with a much greater 
proportion of equity held in the domestic country than mean-variance optimisation would predict.  
We also analyzed the observed US investors’ home bias from an international point of view to see if 
the effect is a worldwide phenomenon. We investigated the monthly and the daily portfolio allocation from the 
perspective of a Japanese, a UK and an European investor, respectively. In all cases we checked the results for 
robustness by including emerging markets and analyzing the results with and without short selling constraints. 
The empirical results indicate that the home bias is indeed an international phenomenon: Investors may think 
globally, but instead act locally, due to greater downside risk from investing abroad. 
The main advantage of this paper is that by focusing on a downside risk model for asset allocation, which 
centres on the empirical distribution of returns, we can observe historically whether any additional risk, in the 
form of negatively skewed distributions and excess kurtosis, may play a role in the decision making process in 
the optimal allocation between domestic and foreign equity. A further advantage of the model is the definition 
of downside risk. It has been acknowledged in the behavioural finance literature that investors tend to frame 
their investment decisions, relative to a benchmark. In the downside risk model this benchmark is determined 
independently, as the domestic equity index or the domestic risk free rate. The ability of the model to 
incorporate behavioural aspects of investors’, means that the allocation of equity is more in line with the 
behaviour of investors in general. 
The empirical results have shown the tendency to concentrate risks on a single asset (country) rather 
than to hold a well diversified portfolio. Clearly, the home bias puzzle is a complex and multi-faceted 
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phenomenon, and explanations for the empirical results have been developed in the literature. The 
dissatisfaction with institutional explanations has led to the consideration of additional behavioural explanations 
such as familiarity, ambiguity aversion, and optimism toward the domestic equity market. The combination of 
prospect theory agents, who show familiarity and optimism toward their domestic stock market, can help to 
explain the home bias puzzle in international finance. The model for downside risk is able to incorporate the 
additional risk involved with investing in foreign equity, and help understand the bias for home equity. It is not 
surprising then that behavioral aspects from investors more willing to invest locally, or at least domestically are 
likely to play a crucial role in the decision making process on optimal portfolio allocation. These behavioral 
aspects are likely to lead to the empirical result that investors hold a greater proportion of their assets 
domestically than would be the case in a mean-variance world. 
The empirical results are of significant interest for further research in asset pricing and portfolio 
management. It would be of interest to specify a utility function for the downside risk investors’ decision to 
changes in his specification of the confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint for alternative 
time horizons. This would enable a direct test of the downside risk approach against the consumption-based 
approach in finance theory. 
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Figure 1  
International Diversification for US Investors 
The figure gives the optimal portfolio selection for a US investor for an international equity portfolio in the 
G7 MSCI equity indices. Optimal allocations are found using the empirical distribution, for monthly data 
from January 1970 until December 2004, and under the assumption of multivariate normality, for a variety 
of confidence levels.  
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Figure 2  
International Diversification for US Investors 
Including Hong Kong and Singapore 
The figure gives the optimal portfolio selection for a US investor for an international equity portfolio in the 
G7 MSCI equity indices and Emerging Market Indices. Optimal allocations are determined using the 
empirical distribution, for monthly data from January 1970 until December 2004, and under the assumption 
of multivariate normality, for a variety of confidence levels.  
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Figure 3 
International Diversification for US Investors 
Including Short Selling Constraints 
The figure gives the optimal portfolio selection for an international equity portfolio in the G7 MSCI equity 
indices and Emerging Market Indices for a US investor including the effects from short selling constraints. 
Optimal allocations are found using the empirical distribution, using monthly data from January 1970 until 
December 2004, and under the assumption of multivariate normality, for a variety of confidence levels.  
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Figure 4  
International Diversification for US Investors – Daily data 
Including Hong Kong and Singapore 
The figure gives the optimal portfolio selection for a US investor for an international equity portfolio in the 
G7 Datastream total return equity indices and Emerging Market Indices. Optimal allocations are determined 
using the empirical distribution, for daily data from January 1973 until December 2004, and under the 
assumption of multivariate normality, for a variety of confidence levels.  
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Figure 5 
International Diversification for US Investors – Daily data 
Including Short Selling Constraints 
The figure gives the optimal portfolio selection for an international equity portfolio in the G7 Datstream total 
return equity indices and Emerging Market Indices for a US investor including the effects from short selling 
constraints. Optimal allocations are found using the empirical distribution, using daily data from January 
1973 until December 2004, and under the assumption of multivariate normality, for a variety of confidence 
levels 
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